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The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to UTAH 
CODE ANN.§ 78A-4-103(2)G). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err in dismissing OneGreatFamily.com's ("OGF") cause 
of action for breach of contract for Ancestry .com' s ("Ancestry") failure to pay funds due 
and owing under the contract when the contract provides for the payment of such funds 
and when OGF specifically alleged that Ancestry had failed to make such payment? 
a. Standard of Review: In reviewing whether a district court properly 
granted a motion to dismiss, the appellate court accepts the factual allegations in 
the complaint as true and interprets those facts and all inferences drawn from them 
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Moreover, a trial court's 
decision granting a motion to dismiss a complaint is a question of law that the 
appellate court reviews for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's 
ruling. Lunceford v. Lunceford, 2006 UT App 266, ilil 2, 8; 139 P.3d 1073. See 
also, Oakwood Viii. LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, iJ 9, 104 P.3d 1226. 
b. Preservation: This issue was raised and preserved in OGF's 
memorandum in opposition to Ancestry's motion to dismiss, and also in OGF's 
objection to the proposed order submitted to the trial court by Ancestry, which was 
ultimately entered by the trial court. R. 142-152, 229-231. 
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2. Did the trial court err in dismissing OGF's cause of action for breach of 
contract for Ancestry's failure to allow a meaningful contractual audit when the contract bl 
specifically provides for audit rights and when OGF alleged in its complaint that 
Ancestry had failed to provide OGF with a meaningful audit opportunity? 
a. Standard of Review: In reviewing whether a district court properly 
granted a motion to dismiss, the appellate court accepts the factual allegations in 
the complaint as true and interprets those facts and all inferences drawn from them G 
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Moreover, a trial court's 
decision granting a motion to dismiss a complaint is a question of law that the 
appellate court reviews for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's 
ruling. Lunceford v. Lunceford, 2006 UT App 266, ,r,r 2, 8; 139 P.3d 1073; see 
also, Oakwood Vil!. LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, iJ 9, 104 P.3d 1226. 
b. Preservation: This issue was raised and preserved in OGF's 
memorandum in opposition to Ancestry's motion to dismiss, and also in OGF's 
objection to the proposed order submitted to the trial court by Ancestry, which was 
ultimately entered by the trial court. R. 142-152, 229-231. 
3. Did the trial court err in determining that the Marketing Agreement 
unambiguously does not require the parties to market each other's subscription service ~ 
and therefore could not be breached, in spite of both the actual language of the contract 
and the parties' years-long prior course of dealing? 
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a. Standard of Review: "The question of whether a contract is 
ambiguous is decided by the court as a matter of law. When determining whether 
a contract is ambiguous, any relevant evidence must be considered. Otherwise, 
the determination of ambiguity is inherently one-sided, namely, it is based solely 
on the extrinsic evidence of the judge's own linguistic education and experience." 
Lunceford, 2006 UT App 266, 1 13. In reviewing whether a district court properly 
granted a motion to dismiss, the appellate court accepts the factual allegations in 
the complaint as true and interprets those facts and all inferences drawn from them 
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Moreover, a trial court's 
decision granting a motion to dismiss a complaint is a question of law that the 
appellate court reviews for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's 
ruling. Id. at 112, 8; 139 P.3d 1073; see also, Oakwood, 2004 UT 101, 19. 
b. Preservation: This issue was raised and preserved in OGF's 
memorandum in opposition to Ancestry's motion to dismiss. R. 142-152. 
4. Did the trial court err in determining that Ancestry had not breached the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in refusing to market under the Marketing 
Agreement because the trial court determined that the Marketing Agreement could not be 
breached? 
a. Standard of Review: "The question of whether a contract is 
ambiguous is decided by the court as a matter of law. When determining whether 
a contract is ambiguous, any relevant evidence must be considered. Otherwise, 
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the determination of ambiguity is inherently one-sided, namely, it is based solely 
on the extrinsic evidence of the judge's own linguistic education and experience." 
Lunceford, 2006 UT App 266, ,r 13. In reviewing whether a district court property 
granted a motion to dismiss, the appellate court accepts the factual allegations in 
the complaint as true and interprets those facts and all inferences drawn from them 
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Moreover, a trial court's 
decision granting a motion to dismiss a complaint is a question of law that the w 
appellate court reviews for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's 
ruling. Id. at ,r,r 2, 8; see also, Oakwood, 2004 UT 101, ,r 9. 
b. Preservation: This issue was raised and preserved m OGF's 
memorandum in opposition to Ancestry's motion to dismiss. R. 142-152. 
5. Did the trial court err in determining that no punitive damages were 
available in this breach of contract matter in spite of the contract's language that punitive 
damages are available in the event of willfulness or gross negligence and when such 
conduct was specifically alleged in the complaint? 
a. Standard of Review: In reviewing whether a district court property 
granted a motion to dismiss, the appellate court accepts the factual allegations in 
the complaint as true and interprets those facts and all inferences drawn from them CJ 
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Moreover, a trial court's 
decision granting a motion to dismiss a complaint is a question of law that the 
appellate court reviews for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's 
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ruling. Lunceford, 2006 UT App 266, 11 2, 8; see also, Oakwood, 2004 UT 101, 
b. Preservation: This issue was raised and preserved in OGF's 
memorandum in opposition to Ancestry's motion to dismiss. R. 135-36. 
STATUTES, RULES OR ORDINANCES WHOSE INTEPRETATION IS 
DETERMINATIVE OF THE APPEAL 
None. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the trial court's decision to grant a motion to dismiss the 
Plaintiffs complaint in its entirety. 
In April 2009, Appellants Z-Corp, dba OneGreatFamily.com and 
OneGreatFamily, LLC (hereinafter OGF) entered into a Marketing Agreement with 
People Search Media, LLC (who operated Archives.com). R. 175. The Marketing 
Agreement provided for the joint marketing of each other's online businesses and for 
profit sharing between the two companies. R. 172, 175. Marketing was specifically 
contemplated within the "paid area" of the other's website. R. 172. During 2009 through 
2012, both OGF and People Search Media, LLC promoted and marketed the other's 
website within the "paid area" of the other's website pursuant to the Marketing 
Agreement. R. 12. As alleged in the complaint, both OGF and People Search Media 
LLC understood "paid area" to mean the area immediately after a new customer enters 
their financial information to sign up for a new Archives.com or OneGreatFamily.com 
subscription. R. 12. Specifically, after subscribing to Archives.com a new subscriber 
- 5 -
would be presented with a page giving the subscriber an opportunity to also subscribe to 
OneGreatFamily.com. R. 12. Additionally, OneGreatFamily.com was listed as an ~ 
available subscription service in the Archives.com Products Page, which was only 
viewable by Archives.com subscription holders (i.e. current customers). R. 11. 
Profit sharing under the Marketing Agreement was also spelled out. People 
Search Media, LLC would remit to OGF 40% of the subscription amount received 
through an OGF subscription obtained through the Archives.com website, and would W 
retain the remaining 60% of the subscription amount (and vice versa). R. 11, 170. This 
division of proceeds applies to both new subscriptions and subsequent renewal 
subscriptions for returning customers who were originated pursuant to the Marketing 
Agreement. R. 11, 170. OGF and People Search Media, LLC coordinated their efforts so 
that Archives.com could grant immediate access to a new subscriber to 
OneGreatFamily.com and would later remit the appropriate portion of the subscription 
funds. R. 11-12. Both OGF and People Search Media, LLC were satisfied with the c..;; 
other's performance, expressed such satisfaction in writing, and both benefited due to the 
nature of the Marketing Agreement. R. 150. 
Then, in August 2012, Ancestry .com (hereinafter "Ancestry") acquired 
Archives.com from People Search Media, LLC. R. 11: In connection with this 
acquisition, Ancestry assumed the Marketing Agreement, extended its perfonnance ~: 
period, and expressly undertook the obligations contained therein. R. 93. Initially, 
Ancestry continued to market OneGreatFamily.com within Archives.com in the same 
manner as People Search Media, LLC had done. R. 11. However, after some time, 
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·...i) 
subscriptions for OneGreatFamily.com declined significantly. R. 11. OGF discovered 
that Ancestry had begun to inconsistently promote OneGreatFamily.com within the "paid 
area" following a new subscription to Archives.com and instead was promoting other 
website subscription services available through Ancestry's subsidiaries. R. 10-11. Also, 
OGF noticed large discrepancies between the number of subscribers who were granted 
new subscription access to the OneGreatFamily.com website through the Archives.com 
website, and the amount of funds being remitted to OGF under the profit sharing 
provision of the Marketing Agreement. R. 9. It appeared that there were up to 70,000 
subscribers for which OGF had never received subscription funds from Ancestry. R. 9. 
Then, in May, 2014, Ancestry completely removed the subscription offer from the "paid 
area" following a new subscription to Archives.com. R. 10. OneGreatFamily.com 
subscriptions were also removed for a time from the Products Page of Archives.com. R. 
10. OGF reached out to Ancestry to determine what precipitated this change and was 
told that Ancestry was "reinterpreting" the meaning of the Marketing Agreement. Not 
only did Ancestry.com cease its marketing activities, it also ceased remitting funds for 
renewal subscriptions under the Marketing Agreement. R.10-11. Ancestry's actions 
deviate from the prior understanding, performance, intent, and actual language of the 
Marketing Agreement and clearly deviate from the prior course of dealing between OGF 
and Ancestry. 
Due to concerns regarding these issues, OGF sought to conduct an audit of 
Ancestry pursuant to an audit provision contained within the Marketing Agreement. R. 9, 
174. The Marketing Agreement provides that either party may conduct an audit to ensure 
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that the terms of the Marketing Agreement are being met. R. 174. OGF requested that 
Ancestry permit it to perfonn the audit required under the contract. R. 9. However, as 
the parties exchanged correspondence, Ancestry indicated that it would not allow 
electronic access to its records and further indicated that it would not provide OGF access 
to necessary infonnation to conduct an actual and meaningful audit. R. 9. 
OGF filed suit in the Fourth District Court, of Utah County, State of Utah for 
breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, conversion, G..i 
tortious interference with prospective economic relations, and punitive damages. R. 1-
14. Ancestry filed a motion to dismiss the complaint under U.R.C.P., Rule 12(b)(6) 
arguing that the Marketing Agreement was unambiguous in its language that the parties 
were under no obligation to market each other. R. 102-125. In opposing the motion to 
dismiss, OGF argued the opposite. Specifically, OGF argued that the Marketing 
Agreement unambiguously required the parties to market each other. R. 135-152. And 
alternatively, even if the Marketing Agreement is ambiguous on the parties' duty to ~ 
market each other, the parties' prior course of dealing and mutual understanding of the 
meaning of the Marketing Agreement was sufficient to create a question of latent 
ambiguity regarding the meaning and intent of the Marketing Agreement such that 
dismissal of the complaint at that early stage of the litigation would be legal error. R. 
135-152. OGF also noted and argued that the complaint also alleged breach of contract 
for Ancestry's failure to remit funds payable under the contract, regardless of whether or 
not there existed a duty to market each other, and Ancestry's failure to permit a 
meaningful audit. R. 144-148. In other words, regardless of whether or not there was a 
- 8 -
duty to market, OGF had properly articulated separate and actionable breach of contract 
claims for failure to remit payment and failure to permit an audit. R. 144-148. OGF 
further noted that if the contract had been breached under any of the theories set forth by 
OGF, and Ancestry had committed any of these breaches with the intent to deprive OGF 
from receiving the fruits of the contract, then Ancestry had also breached the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. R. 142-144. Finally, OGF noted that the 
contract contained a specific provision allowing for the imposition of punitive damages 
against the breaching party in the event that the breach was due to gross negligence or 
wilful misconduct. R. 135-136, 174. OGF had alleged wilful misconduct in its 
complaint, and therefore noted that dismissal of the complaint would be improper in the 
face of this affirmative allegation. R. 3, 135-136 
After briefing and oral argument, the trial court rejected OGF's arguments and 
granted Ancestry's motion to dismiss. R. 218-224. In granting the motion to dismiss, the 
trial court never mentioned or addressed OGF's claims for breach of contract for failure 
to remit payment and failure to permit a meaningful audit. R. 218-224. The trial court 
seemed to focus completely on the question of whether there was a duty to market and 
whether the Marketing Agreement was ambiguous regarding a duty to market. R. 218-
224. Ultimately the trial court found that there was no duty to market under the 
Marketing Agreement, and dismissed the whole complaint. R. 218-224. As the trial 
court was preparing to enter a final order on the matter, OGF submitted an objection to 
the trial court, noting that the trial court had failed to address the breach of contract 
claims for failure to remit payment and failure to permit a meaningful audit. R. 229-231. 
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The trial court overruled the objection and entered a final order dismissing the complaint 
in its entirety. R. 236-241. OGF filed a timely appeal1. R. 242-243. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
On appeal from a district court's decision to grant a motion to dismiss, the 
appellate court accepts the factual allegations in the complaint as true and draws all 
inferences therefrom in favor of the Plaintiff and Appellant. In this case, the trial court 
erred in granting a motion to dismiss the entire complaint. The errors are myriad. 
First, the trial court ignored the existence of two claims for breach of contract. 
These, claims (for failure to make payment and failure to allow a contractual audit) were 
clearly set forth in the complaint and clearly briefed in the opposition to the motion to 
dismiss. Moreover, the claims were well-pied and represent viable causes of action. The 
trial court ignored the existence of these claims and dismissed the whole complaint 
anyway. 
Second, the trial court erroneously determined that the Marketing Agreement (the 
contract between the parties) did not contain within it a duty to market, and therefore 
Ancestry's refusal to market was not a breach of contract. In reaching this conclusion, 
the trial court negated multiple provisions in the contract, including a "best efforts" 
provision (the trial court expressly concluded that "best efforts" can be no efforts), a 
"shall perform" provision (the trial court expressly states that this provision is negated), ~ 
and a "Promote the other company's Complimentary Products" provision (which the trial 
1 OGF does not appeal the trial court's dismissal of its conversion claim or its tortious 
interference with prospective economic relations claim. 
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court ignored and did not address even though it was briefed). The trial court should 
have attempted to harmonize these provisions and give them effect rather than negating 
them. In addition, the trial court failed to take into consideration the parties' intentions 
and expectations and prior course of dealing when interpreting and determining the 
meaning of the contract terms. 
Third, the trial court erroneously concluded that Ancestry could exercise the 
discretion granted to it under the Marketing Agreement on how to market so as to engage 
in no marketing at all. However, the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
prevents a party to a contract from exercising discretion in the performance of the 
contract in such a way as to deprive the other party from receiving the fruits and benefits 
of the contract. The trial court erred in endorsing Ancestry's actions depriving OGF from 
the benefits and fruits of the contract and dismissing OGF's cause of action for breach of 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
Finally, the trial court erred in dismissing the claim for punitive damages even 
though the contract has an express provision allowing for punitive damages for breach of 
contract in the event of willful misconduct, and such willful misconduct was expressly 
alleged in the complaint. For these reasons, the decision of the trial court dismissing the 
complaint should be reversed and the matter should be remanded back to the trial court. 
ARGUMENT 
In reviewing whether a district court properly granted a motion to dismiss, the 
appellate court accepts the factual allegations in the complaint as true and interprets those 
facts and all inferences drawn from them in the light most favorable to the non-moving 
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party. Moreover, a trial court's decision granting a motion to dismiss a complaint is a 
question of law that the appellate court reviews for correctness, giving no deference to Gd 
the trial court's ruling. Lunceford v. Lunceford, 2006 UT App 266, ,r,r 2, 8; 139 P.3d 
1073; see also, Oakwood Vil/. LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, ,r 9, 104 P.3d 1226. 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DISMISSED OGF'S CLAIMS 
FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT FOR ANCESTRY'S FAILURE TO REMIT 
PAYMENT UNDER THE MARKETING AGREEMENT AND FAILURE TO 
PERMIT A MEANINGFUL AUDIT UNDER THE CONTRACT. 
The trial court erroneously dismissed OGF's well pied claims for breach of 
contract for failure to make appropriate payments under the Marketing Agreement and 
for breach of contract for failure to permit a meaningful audit. The trial court dismissed 
these claims without ever acknowledging them or addressing them. 
Under the Marketing Agreement, 
[Ancestry] will pay to OGF a Revenue Share consisting of 
40% of the Gross Revenues (net of returns and charge backs) 
collected from any customer who is referred to OGF from 
[Ancestry] and is subsequently billed by [Ancestry]. This 
Revenue Share will apply to all payments made by such 
customers for current membership subscriptions nor for any 
future new product offering or services. 
R. 170. 
Thus, regardless of whether or not there is an obligation on either party to market the 
other, if marketing occurs under the Marketing Agreement, then there is a clear 
obligation to share revenues consistent with the revenue sharing provisions of the '1.1 
Marketing Agreement. Ancestry is not permitted to sell subscriptions to OGF' s products 
and just keep all the money. If Ancestry sells an OGF product, Ancestry must remit a 
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portion of the revenue, consistent with the terms of the Marketing Agreement, regardless 
of whether there is a duty to market or not. 
In its complaint, OGF specifically alleged that "As the Parties have exchanged 
subscription and payment information for thousands of customers, OGF has uncovered 
information that between 20,000 and 70,000 payments from OneGreatFamily.com 
customer subscriptions are missing that are due from Ancestry." R. 9. The complaint 
goes on to state that, "Ancestry breached the Marketing Agreement because, based on 
information and belief, it has withheld payments for subscriptions that are due to OGF. 
R. 8. This a clear and well pied allegation of breach of contract on the part of Ancestry 
that is not dependent upon whether the Marketing Agreement contains within it a duty to 
market. 
The same is true of OGF's cause of action for breach of contract for Ancestry's 
failure to permit a meaningful audit as permitted under the contract. The Marketing 
Agreement has detailed language regarding each party's right to conduct an audit of the 
other in relation to their marketing activities. R. 174. The Marketing Agreement has a 
separate "Audit Rights" section which provides, 
OGF shall have the right to send an employee or other party, 
to [Ancestry's] offices to inspect [Ancestry's] records to the 
extent reasonably necessary and solely for the purpose of 
verifying [Ancestry's] records regarding customer sign-ups, 
cancellations, and other infonnation material to the terms of 
payment under the Marketing Program. 
R. 174. 
In its complaint, OGF alleges that "OGF demanded an audit of Ancestry's records" and 
"Ancestry refused to honor OGF's request and instead offered only to allow OGF to 
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inspect some limited financial records that would not have enabled OGF to conduct a 
meaningful and actual audit." R. 9. The complaint goes on to say that, "Ancestry ~ 
breached the Marketing Agreement when it refused to comply completely with the terms 
of the Audit Rights provision of the Marketing Agreement." R. 8. Again, this is a clear 
and well pied allegation for breach of contract on the part of Ancestry that is not 
dependent upon whether the Marketing Agreement contains within it a duty to market. 
When Ancestry filed its motion to dismiss the entirety of the complaint on theory G 
that it had no duty to market under the Marketing Agreement, OGF pointed out in its 
opposing memorandum that, "Plaintiffs have information that between 20,000 and 70,000 
subscription payments are missing .... The facts alleged are sufficient to support a claim 
for breach of the Marketing Agreement." R. 145. As to the audit rights breach, the 
opposing memorandum states, "Defendants have failed to comply with the audit 
provision of the Marketing Agreement." R. 145. And after some analysis, further asserts 
that, "The Defendants refused to provide access to necessary information that would 
allow the Plaintiffs to verify whether or not there were indeed missing subscription 
payments. By refusing to provide access to sufficient infonnation to make the audit 
meaningful, Defendants breached the Marketing Agreement." R. 144. 
In other words, these two causes of action for breach of contract were squarely 
before the trial court on the motion to dismiss. They were clearly stated in the c..;.; 
complaint-they were clearly articulated and briefed in opposition to the motion to 
dismiss. In spite of this, the trial court completely ignores the existence of these claims in 
ruling on the motion to dismiss. There is no mention of them at all. R. 224. The claims 
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were well pied and stand independent of any duty to market under the Marketing 
Agreement. Ancestry is not allowed to sell OGF's products and keep all the money. 
Ancestry is not permitted to refuse to supply infonnation regarding all the OGF 
subscriptions it has sold when the Marketing Agreement requires such information to be 
disclosed through an audit right. These are clear causes of action that were squarely 
before the trial court. The trial court never addressed them, and that was legal error. 
After the trial court issued its ruling and as Ancestry had presented its proposed 
order reflecting the trial court's ruling, OGF filed an objection to the proposed order 
which specifically pointed out to the trial court its error in never addressing these separate 
claims. OGF stated, 
Not only did Plaintiffs bring a cause of action for breach of 
contract on the theory that the Defendants had failed to 
appropriately market under the requirements of the Marketing 
Agreement, but Plaintiffs also alleged that Defendants had 
breached the contract by failing to render payment to 
Plaintiffs for funds already received by Defendants under the 
terms of the Marketing Agreement. ... 
The Proposed Order also does not address Plaintiffs' claim 
for breach of contract on the theory that Defendants failed to 
allow Plaintiffs access to information in order to allow 
Plaintiffs to conduct a meaningful audit under the Marketing 
Agreement. ... 
The Court's Ruling makes no findings as to why either of 
these causes of action should be dismissed and the 
Defendants' Proposed Order is likewise silent on these two 
causes of action. Nonetheless, both the Ruling and the 
Proposed Order dismiss all the causes of action in the 
Complaint without specifically addressing these two causes of 
action. This is error. 
R. 230. 
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The trial court overruled this objection with a separate ruling. R. 237. Thus, in 
spite of having notice of this error before the entry of a final order, the trial court 
detennined to proceed anyway and dismissed all the claims of the complaint, including 
the claims for failure to make payment under the contract and failure to allow an audit 
under the contract. R. 241. In doing so, the trial court committed reversible legal error 
and this court should reverse the decision of the trial court. 
Q 
II. THE MARKETING AGREEMENT UNAMBIGUOUISL Y REQUIRES ~ 
THE PARTIES TO MARKET EACH OTHER'S SUBSCRIPTION SERVICE. 
The trial court erroneously determined that the Marketing Agreement does not 
obligate the parties to market each other's subscription service and improperly dismissed ~ 
the complaint. However, the contract is unambiguous in requiring the parties to market 
each other's subscription service, but grants the parties discretion in the manner in which 
they conduct their marketing activities. At most, if the contractual language is 
ambiguous and capable of more than one plausible meaning, the relevant extrinsic 
evidence as presented in the complaint together with all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom should have been considered by the trial court and the motion to dismiss 
should have been denied. 
The Marketing Agreement outlines the responsibilities and rights as between the 
parties, and references the type of marketing contemplated by reference to an Exhibit 'A' 
entitled "Marketing Program." R. 175. The Marketing Agreement also provides that 
"[The parties] will use best efforts in the performance of this Agreement." R. 175. 
Within the Marketing Program Exhibit A of the contract, there is a table with different 
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sections numbered and titled. R. 172. The following relevant provisions are set forth 
under the first table section designated "Marketing" within the Marketing Program 
Exhibit A: 
Each party shall perform the following activities as the 
"Marketing Partner" at their sole cost and expense, and under 
their own exclusive control. The Marketing Partner can only 
market the other company's Complementary Products within 
the paid area of the Marketing Partner's website or via email 
to previous paying customers. 
Promote the other company's Complementary Products as 
defined in Exhibit "B" through the web sites it owns and 
other applications. 
R. 172. 
The phrase "shall perform the following activities" followed by "Promote the 
other company's Complementary Products ... through the web sites it owns and other 
applications" presents an unambiguous contractual obligation on the part of each party to 
the contract to market the other's products. R. 172. This, coupled with the overarching 
contractual obligation that each party "will use best efforts in the performance of this 
Agreement" makes it hard to conceive that using best efforts in promoting the other on 
the web sites each party owns can conceivably include not performing any marketing 
activity at all. 
Surprisingly, the trial court reached the exact opposite conclusion. The trial court 
concluded that the phrase "under their exclusive control" gave such broad discretion to 
Ancestry in the activities which it "shall perform" that Ancestry could use that discretion 
to not perform any marketing activities at all. Thus, the trial court erroneously concluded 
that there was no duty to market. In reach.ing this conclusion, the trial court ignored and 
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did not address the prov1s1on that Ancestry was obligated to "Promote the other 
company's Complementary Products ... through the web sites it owns and other ~ 
applications" and determined that the provision that each party was obligated to "use best 
efforts in the performance of this Agreement" could include doing nothing at all. R. 220. 
This was legal error. 
A trial court must first attempt to harmonize all of the 
contract's provisions and all of its terms when determining 
whether the plain language of the contract is ambiguous. It is 
axiomatic that a contract should be interpreted so as to 
harmonize all of its provisions and all of its terms, which 
terms should be given effect if it is possible to do so. Thus, to 
harmonize the provisions of a contract we examine the entire 
contract and all of its parts in relation to each other and give a 
reasonable construction of the contract as a whole to 
determine the parties' intent. 
Gilmor v. Macey, 2005 UT App 351, 1 19, 121 P.3d 57 
(internal quotations and citations omitted). 
This principle is black letter law in Utah. See also, Wagner v. Clifton, 2002 UT 109, 1 
16, 62 P.3d 440; LDS Hosp. v. Capitol Life Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1988); 
Brixen & Christopher Architects v. Elton, 777 P.2d 1039, 1043 (Utah App. 1989). 
In this case the trial court ignored the provision stating that Ancestry is obligated 
to "Promote the other company's Complimentary Products ... through the web sites it ~ 
owns and other applications." There was no discussion on the part of the trial court 
regarding how this provision might be harmonized with its conclusion that there was no 
duty to market. There was no effort to give this term any legal effect or to even discuss 
it. There was no examination of the entire contract and no determination of how this 
provision fits in relation to the other provisions of the contract. There was no effort to 
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give this provision reasonable construction in the context of the whole of the contract to 
determine the parties' intent. In ignoring and not addressing this provision, the trial court 
erred. 
The trial court also failed to harmonize the "shall perform" provision and the "best 
efforts" provision of the contract. Specifically, rather than harmonizing the "shall 
perform" provision, the trial court reasoned that the discretion granted to the parties in 
fashioning their marketing activities eviscerated the "shall perform" provision. As the 
trial court stated, "This clause turns all exercise of any activities referred to in the 
independent clause over to the 'exclusive control' of the exercising party, essentially 
negating the phrase 'shall perform.'" R. 221. "[N]egating" a provision of a contract is 
not harmonizing it, is not giving that term legal effect, and is not giving reasonable 
construction to the whole of the contract. Rather, negating a provision of a contract in 
this manner is legal error. 
The trial court committed similar error when it also declined to give the "best 
efforts" provision any effect. The trial court reasoned that since Ancestry had discretion 
in the fashioning of its marketing activities the "best efforts" clause carried no meaning. 
In the words of the trial court, "Thus, under the language of the contract, [Ancestry's] 
best efforts at marketing could include no efforts." R. 220. This is error. Best efforts 
cannot mean no efforts. The parties meant more than 'nothing' when they negotiated for 
and included a best efforts clause in the Marketing Agreement. Best efforts is defined as, 
"Diligent attempts to carry out an obligation. As a standard, a best-efforts obligation is 
stronger than a good-faith obligation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, p. 123 (Abridged 7th 
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Ed., 2000). It's hard to conceive how diligent attempts to carry out an obligation can 
amount to doing nothing at all. It's hard to conceive how the parties to the contract could 
have intended "best efforts" to mean no efforts. The trial court's decision does exactly 
what Gilmor and many other Utah cases prohibit. The trial court has eviscerated rather 
than harmonized provisions of the contract. And it had rendered provisions of the 
contract meaningless rather than giving effect to all of the contract terms. The trial 
court's decision is legal error. 
The sole purpose of the Marketing Agreement was to provide for marketing of 
each other's products and sharing the revenue generated by those marketing efforts. 
Rather than harmonizing the provisions to accomplish the purpose of the agreement, the 
trial court focused on a small portion of the contract, ignoring the other provisions and 
thereby eviscerating the contract's purpose. 
The trial court seems to have committed these legal errors due to its conclusion 
that under the "exclusive control" provision of the contract, Ancestry gained unfettered 
and unreviewable discretion in the way it might choose to fashion its marketing activities, 
to the point that it could choose to not market at all under the Marketing Agreement. 
However, as will be discussed at greater length in a separate section below, the granting 
of discretion to a party in the manner in which it might perform under a contract comes 
Cv· 
(;, 
with important legal limitations. A party cannot exercise that discretion in a manner that ~ 
deprives the other party to the contract from receiving the expected fruits of the contract. 
Rather, the party must exercise its discretion in good faith and deal fairly with its 
contractual partner. The greater the level of discretion afforded to a contract party, the 
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higher and more stringent its duty becomes to exercise that discretion reasonably. See, 
Markham v. Bradley, 2007 UT App 379, 173 P.3d 865; Smith v. Grand Canyon 
Expedition Co., 2003 UT 57, 1 19, 84 P.3d 1154; Cook Assocs. v. Utah Sch. & Inst. Trust 
Lands Admin., 2010 UT App 284,127,243 P.3d 888. 
At the very most, the trial court's analysis regarding why it can disregard the "best 
efforts," "Promote the other company's Complementary Products" and "shall perform" 
provisions contained in the contract only present the possibility that there exists alternate 
plausible readings of the contractual language and that there exists ambiguity in the 
language of the contract. Thus, even under the trial court's own reasoning, it should have 
conducted an in depth analysis and exploration regarding both facial and latent ambiguity 
in the contract, considered the extrinsic evidence as presented in the complaint, and 
denied the motion to dismiss. 
Ambiguity may present itself in two different ways in contracts, namely "( 1) facial 
ambiguity with regard to the language of the contract and (2) ambiguity with regard to 
the intent of the contracting parties." Hillcrest Inv. Co., LLC v. UDOT, 2015 UT App 
140, 17, 352 P.3d 128. (internal citations and quotations omitted). "A contractual term is 
ambiguous if, looking to the language of the contract alone, it is reasonably capable of 
being understood in more than one way such that there are tenable positions on both 
~ sides." Deep Creek Ranch, LLC v. Utah State Armory Bd., 2008 UT 3, 1 13, 178 P.3d 
886; see also, Hillcrest, 2015 UT App 140, 17; Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 
108 (Utah 1991 ). "When determining whether a contract is ambiguous, any relevant 
evidence must be considered. Otherwise, the determination of ambiguity is inherently 
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one-sided, namely, it is based solely on the extrinsic evidence of the judge's own 
linguistic education and experience." Ward v. lntermountain Farmers Ass'n, 907 P.2d 
264, 268 (Utah 1995); see also, Hillcrest, 2015 UT App 140, iJ 8. "Then, after the trial 
court has considered evidence of contrary interpretations, the trial court must ensure that 
the interpretations contended for are reasonably supported by the language of the 
contract." Hillcrest, 2015 UT App 140, iJ 8; see also, Hall v. Hall, 2013 UT App 280, iJ 
12,316P.3d970. \u..i 
Thus, the first step is to consider relevant extrinsic evidence to determine whether 
the contract is ambiguous. Hillcrest, 2015 UT App 140, iJ 9. Indeed "Utah no longer 
strictly applies the ... plain meaning rule; rather, that rule is just part of the initial inquiry 
to determine whether an ambiguity exists in contract language." State v. Davis, 2011 UT 
App 74, if 4 fn. 3, 272 P.3d 745 (internal citations and quotations omitted). As a trial 
court conducts this initial analysis, "[ a ]lthough the terms of an instrument may seem clear 
to a particular reader--including a judge--this does not rule out the possibility that the 
parties chose the language of the agreement to express a different meaning. A judge 
should therefore consider any credible evidence offered to show the parties' intention." 
Ward, 907 P.2d at 268. A trial court should, "consider the writing in light of the 
surrounding circumstances" rather than embracing a strict rule which would "restrict a 
determination of whether ambiguity exists to a judge's determination of the meaning of ~ 
the terms of the writing itself." Id. (internal citations omitted). The trial court should 
conduct "a preliminary consideration of all credible evidence offered to prove the 
intention of the parties so that the court can place itself in the same situation in which the 
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parties found themselves at the time of contracting." Id. Evidence of a prior course of 
dealing between contracting parties is directly relevant and should be considered by a 
trial court which is attempting to make a determination regarding whether the contract is 
facially ambiguous. Peterson v. Sunrider Corp., 2002 UT 43, ,r 23, 48 P.3d 918. 
It is important to note that this consideration of extrinsic evidence to ascertain the 
intent of the parties and determine whether the contract is facially ambiguous is distinct 
and separate from the admission of extrinsic evidence after a determination of ambiguity 
has been reached in order to resolve the ambiguity and ultimately interpret the meaning 
of the contract. The two analyses are discrete, and although there may be overlap in 
evidence, the purpose of the consideration of the extrinsic evidence is wholly distinct. In 
other words, relevant, extrinsic evidence of "the facts known to the parties at the time 
they entered the [ contract] is admissible to assist the court in determining whether the 
contract is ambiguous." Nielsen v. Gold's Gym, 2003 UT 37, ,r 7, 78 P.3d 600. 
Thereafter, if ambiguity is found, extrinsic evidence is also admissible to help ultimately 
determine the actual meaning of the contract and resolve the ambiguity. Gilmor, 2005 
UT App 351, if 37. 
In the present matter, the trial court did not conduct any such analysis and failed to 
consider the allegations contained in the complaint, which it was required to treat as true 
in the motion to dismiss. Further, the trial court did not conduct any analysis into 
extrinsic evidence of the parties' prior course of dealing together with their intentions and 
expectations at the time of contracting, which might provide insight into whether the 
Marketing Agreement is facially ambiguous on the question of whether there is a duty to 
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market. Instead, the trial court misread the law and seems to have conflated the 
admissibility of extrinsic evidence to ascertain an ambiguity with the admissibility of ~ 
extrinsic evidence to resolve an ambiguity. The trial court states, "The Court may only 
consider extrinsic evidence of the parties' intentions when a contract is ambiguous." R. 
0 
222. As shown above, this statement is legally incorrect. The trial court should consider 
extrinsic evidence to detennine whether the Marketing Agreement is ambiguous. Thus, 
even if the trial court's reading of the meaning of the Marketing Agreement is plausible, " 
the trial court should then have considered the extrinsic evidence concerning the parties' 
intentions and prior course of dealing, to determine if that reading might also conform 
with the parties' intentions and behavior. To do so would require a determination that 
there remain questions of fact regarding intent, and a determination that the complaint 
states a valid cause of action for breach of contract under that potential meaning of the 
contract. The trial court did not do this, and instead committed reversible error. 
Indeed, the trial court has done what the case law specifically warns against-it 
has substituted its own linguistic education and experience for that of the actual 
intentions of the parties. See Ward, 907 P.2d at 268; Hillcrest, 2015 UT App 140,, 7. 
The trial court engages in a grammatical and linguistic analysis of what the "exclusive 
control" provision means in the context of the sentence in which it appears. R. 221-22. 
The trial court discusses the relationship of this provision to the "shall perfonn" provision G; 
and the "best efforts" provision and concludes that the ''exclusive control" provision 
"negates" the other two and rules the day. R. 221-22. The error in this analysis, in 
addition to what has already been discussed above, is that it consists of the trial court 
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engaging in a "one-sided" analysis based solely on "the judge's own linguistic education 
~ and experience'' and without considering the parties own intentions. Id. This is 
reversible legal error. This Court should therefore reverse the trial court's decision to 
dismiss OGF's complaint and remand this case back to the district court. 
III. THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING 
REQUIRES THAT ANCESTRY CANNOT EXERCISE ANY DISCRETION IT 
HAS UNDER THE MARKETING AGREEMENT TO COMPLETELY 
DEPRIVE OGF OF THE BENEFITS OF THE MARKETING AGREEMENT. 
OGF properly alleged in its complaint that Ancestry's behavior in relation to the 
contract violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and the trial court's 
decision to dismiss that claim was legal error. 
Under the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, parties to a contract agree "not 
to intentionally do anything to injure the other party's right to receive the benefits of the 
contract." Markham, 2007 UT App 379, iJ 18. A grant of discretion in the performance 
of a contract does not remove the covenant of good faith and fair dealing from the 
contract, but instead amplifies the duty. See Smith, 2003 UT 57, iI 19 ("[W]here one 
party has discretion over another according to the terms of the contract, that party must 
~ act with good faith and fair dealing."); Cook Assocs., 2010 UT App 284, iJ 27. Indeed, 
"[t]he degree to which a party to a contract may invoke the protections of the covenant 
turns on the extent to which the contracting parties have defined their expectations and 
imposed limitations on the exercise of discretion through express contract terms." 
Markham, 2007 UT App 379, iJ 21 (quoting Smith, 2003 UT 57, iJ 20). When "express 
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contract terms" do not limit a party's exercise of discretion, the covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing is paramount. Id. 
Courts imply a "reasonableness" limitation to the exercise of contractually 
permitted discretion. In Markham, the court supplied an "objective standard of 
reasonableness" to a seller's discretion to cancel a real estate purchase contract if it 
disapproved of the buyer's financial information. Markham, 2007 UT App 379, ,r 22. 
The court noted that without an objective reasonableness standard governing the seller's G 
discretion, the seller's promise to sell the property would be "illusory." Id. at ,r 23. 
Similarly, in Cook Assoc., a clause in a lease agreement gave the landlord "sole 
discretion" to raise rents every five years as the landlord deemed "reasonably necessary." 
Cook Assoc., 2010 UT App 284, ,r,r 18, 27. The court held that because of the explicit 
grant of discretion to the landlord, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing served "to 
protect the other party from an inappropriate exercise of that discretion." Id. at ,r 27. 
Because the contract imposed no "agreed formula" or "'express standard," the landlord C) 
was required to exercise its discretion "reasonably within the contemplation of the 
parties" in accordance with their "purpose, intentions, and expectations" when it raised 
rent. Id. at ,r,r 28-29. Finally, Utah law is clear that, 
An examination of express contract terms alone is insufficient 
to determine whether there has been a breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. To comply with his 
obligation to perform a contract in good faith, a party's 
actions must be consistent with the agreed common purpose 
and the justified expectations of the other party. The purpose, 
intentions, and expectations of the parties should be 
determined by considering the contract language and the 
course of dealings between and conduct of the parties. 
- 26 -
St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 
200 (Utah 1991 )(internal citations omitted, emphasis in 
original). 
In the instant case, OGF presented a complaint that alleged that Ancestry had 
improperly reinterpreted the Marketing Agreement in an unreasonable way. R. 6-7. The 
trial court was required to accept those allegations as true for the purposes of the motion 
to dismiss. Id. at 196. Specifically, that Ancestry unreasonably decided that the 
Marketing Agreement did not contain an obligation to market and had therefore ceased 
its marketing activities. Ancestry argued to the trial court that the discretion granted to it 
under the marketing agreement was so broad that it was not required to market at all. R. 
102-125. In support of this theory, Ancestry relied on a portion of the Marketing 
agreement which provides as follows: 
Each party shall perform the following activities as the 
"Marketing Partner" at their sole cost and expense, and under 
their own exclusive control. 
R. 172. 
The trial court accepted this argument, reasoning that, 
Generally, "shall perform" is indeed obligatory language that 
imposes a duty upon a party, and would do so in this case 
were the sentence to end there. However, in this case, this 
sentence includes the dependent clause "at their sole cost and 
expense, and under their own exclusive control." This 
dependent clause is a restrictive modifying clause, changing 
the entire meaning of the independent clause. This clause 
turns all exercise of any activities referred to in the 
independent clause over to the "exclusive control" of the 
exerc1smg party, essentially negating the phrase "shall 
perform." Because each party maintains exclusive control 
over any activities perfonned under the Marketing 
Agreement, each party retains the right to perform any 
amount of marketing that the party chooses, including no 
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marketing at all. Because Defendants have no affirmative 
duty to perform any marketing activity under the Marketing 
Agreement at all, they cannot be in breach of contract for 
performing no marketing activity. 
R. 221. 
As already discussed above, this ruling and rationale by the trial court is erron~ous 
for a number of reasons. 2 As it relates to the claim for breach of the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing, the trial court expressly states that Ancestry is permitted to 
interpret the contract in a manner which allows Ancestry to strip from OGF the ~ 
anticipated fruits of the contract. This result is exactly what the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing is designed to prevent. 
As set forth above, if Ancestry had discretion in the manner in which it could 
market under the Marketing Agreement, as the trial court found, then Ancestry has a duty 
to exercise that discretion reasonably. Moreover, without express definitions or 
limitations on how the discretion should be exercised, Ancestry's duty to exercise that 
discretion reasonably is even more amplified. Smith, 2003 UT 57, ,r 20; Markham, 2007 
UT App 379, ,r 21. The trial court's decision that the Marketing Agreement contains no 
duty to market accomplishes the very result that this Court specifically warned against in 
Markham. The promised fruits of the contract become "illusory." 2007 UT App 379, ,r 
22. Similar to Cook Assoc., the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing should 
2 Those reasons include the failure to consider extrinsic evidence like the parties' prior 
course of dealing and the intent of the individuals who originally drafted and entered into 
the Marketing Agreement to determine if there is latent ambiguity, as well as an express 
willingness on the part of the trial court to disregard or eviscerate clear contract terms, 
rather than harmonize and give effect to all terms, like finding that the phrase "shall 
perform" has been "'negated." 
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serve "to protect the other party from an inappropriate exercise of that discretion." 2010 
UT App 284, ,r 27. The trial court's failure to acknowledge that the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing protects OGF, and the trial court's outright endorsement of 
Ancestry's abuse of the discretion granted to it in the contract, was legal error. 
OGF properly articulated a cause of action for breach of the covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing by asserting that Ancestry had improperly reinterpreted the contract in an 
unreasonable manner which directly deprived OGF of the fruits of the contract and which 
deviated from the purpose, intentions, and expectations and was directly contrary to the 
parties' prior course of dealing. R. 6-7; see St. Benedict's, 811 P.2d at 200. The cause of 
action was well pied and, for the purposes of the motion to dismiss, the trial court was 
required to accept those facts as true. Id. at 196. The trial court committed error, when, 
in the face of these well pied allegations, it found that the benefits OGF expected to 
receive under the contract were illusory and that Ancestry had no duty to perform any 
marketing at all. The trial court should have permitted OGF to proceed with its claim of 
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing when it properly alleged that 
Ancestry had breached its duty to exercise its discretion in a manner that was "reasonably 
within the contemplation of the parties" and in accordance with their "purpose, 
intentions, and expectations." Cook Assoc. 2010 UT App 284 at ,r,r 28-29. Indeed, the 
trial court declined to even allow OGF the opportunity to develop evidence on what the 
"purpose, intentions, and expectations" of the parties even were. This was legal error and 
requires reversal. OGF presented a properly pied claim and should be provided an 
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opportunity to prove that claim through appropriate legal process. This Court should 
reverse the decision of the trial court. 
IV. THE CONTRACT HAS AN EXPRESS PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
PROVISION AND OGF PRESENTED A PROPER CAUSE OF ACTION FOR 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES. 
The trial court dismissed OGF's cause of action for punitive damages because it 
found that "because there is no breach of contract. "3 However, if OGF did properly plead 
valid causes of action in its complaint, then its claim for punitive damages also survives. ~ 
The Marketing Agreement contains the following punitive damages provision, 
In no event will a Party be liable to the other for indirect, 
incidental, consequential, punitive, special or exemplary 
damages . . . unless such breach is as a result of gross 
negligence or willful misconduct. 
R. 99. 
The complaint states, 
The combined actions of Ancestry to breach and thwart 
performance under the Marketing Agreement and prevent 
OGF from receiving the fruits of the contract constitute 
willful and malicious conduct because the intentionally 
breached the clear and understood language of the contract. 
Such actions were taken intentionally, knowingly, and with 
conscious disregard for OGF's rights. 
R. 3. 
These allegations properly state a cause of action for punitive damages under the 
terms of the Marketing Agreement and the trial court recognized such, but dismissed 
3 It is also worth noting that on a motion to dismiss, the trial court should not decide 
whether a breach of contract occurred, but rather whether or not the complaint states a 
valid cause of action for breach of contract under the facts alleged. 
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them on the basis of its conclusion to dismiss all other causes of action in the complaint. 
-.iJ R. 219. If this Court reverses the decision of the trial court to dismiss OGF' s breach of 
contract claims and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, it must 
also reverse the decision of the trial court to dismiss its properly pied cause of action for 
contractually allowed punitive damages. 
CONCLUSION 
For the aforementioned reasons, this Court should hold that the trial court 
committed reversible legal error when it failed to address or consider OGF's causes of 
vJ action for breach of contract for failure to make payment and for failure to allow an audit 
under the contract. This Court should further hold that the Marketing Agreement 
unambiguously contains a duty to market and the trial court's decision to the contrary 
was likewise in error. Also, this Court should determine that OGF presented a properly 
pied claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in alleging 
,,,,. .. 
that Ancestry acted unreasonably when it <Jecided to engage in no marketing efforts at all 
under the Marketing Agreement and reverse the decision of the trial court. Finally,_ this 
Court should reverse the trial court's decision dismissing OGF's claim for contractually 
permitted punitive damages. 
DATED and SIGNED this £¾"of September, 2015. 
JEFFS & JEFFS, P.C. 
- 31 -
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 
I certify that this Brief complies with the type and volume limitations of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 24(f)(l)(A), because this Brief contains 8,720 words 
(including headings, footnotes and quotations) in 13 point Times New Roman font, 
excluding the parts of the Brief exempted by Rule 24( f)( 1 )(B ), as calculated by Microsoft 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that the original Brief of Appellants Z-Corp and OneGreatFamily, 
LLC, together with required copies, was hand delivered to the Clerk of the Court, in the 
Utah Court of Appeals and two copies mailed to the below named parties by placing the 
same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, this 4th day of September, 2015, 
addressed as follows: 
Mark 0. Morris 
Amber M. Mettler 
SNELL & WILMER LLP 
~ 15 West South Temple 
Suite 1200 
Gateway Tower West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
- 33 -
ADDENDUM 
INDEX TO ADDENDUM 
1. Marketing Agreement 
2. Consent to Assignment 
3. Complaint 
4. Ruling Re: Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 
5. Objection to Defendants' Proposed Order Granting Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss and Dismissing Plaintifr s Complaint 
Addendum A 
-MARKETING AGREEMENT. 
THIS: AGREEMENT IS in~4~ as 'Q{ Aprit2Q, 700~· ~y and benveen .Z~Coip,. a u·tah·eozpo~fon,dba 
OneGreatFamiiy.com-(he~~~~ . .r~furr~ as~ uo_GF''}with its·prla:tjpal piaC.e ofbusinesslocaied ~ 143 We~t 1200 
·Norµt #l OQ; Springyilie, U~ ~46~3 and People Seafuh. Ivfe4fa, LLC., a: ~~vada. J,i~ited Lmbil_i~-C~rpo~ti<>n ,vith. 
its rlrincip~ pl~ce· ofbusiriess located at l 0 1 Uni-vetsity Ave.~- Sui~ #320, :PalQ ;Alto, CA 94301 (heremafter 
referred :to. as "P.SM'). ·· 
WHEREAS, P.SM snd OG.F a.rt m the pusiness of oni1ne · marketing and ·seliing• ·vaxfotlS praduc..ts and 
s~i~ to cQusum.ers. · · · 
~~$~:tltc::patties d~re.for-PS)fto )lse:.the·OQf Q.am:e ~d ~~ tQ-.allow PSM CU$totn~~ tQ 
purclmse: actesS lo OOF;s prodl.lcts @d ~ef;(fi~ .aJ}d =~~9 fo( OGF to· use. the. P.SM nam.e-and. tt~~nr~ ·to ~9w 
OFO customers to _pur~,: PSM produq~: and ·s~.rvices. as· pfuvioetf h~reut:and :fur.tlier- d~cribeq. m Exhibit A 
a~hed.herefo ana·.m~e-~a.rt ·o~ tlns--Agreement:(tbe '1Marketmi:l>rt'.>gi8Jll")r 
·· ·Now, TBE~FOT{E, fat.and: w ~nsid~ratj'on of:1he promises -and eov.eilant$· ~tained. Ji¢rein an4 onier 
go9'1 and vaiuable · ~~i~e~on,. Uie -rect:i.P4 SU:fficlency ·and. ad~·-of ·wlti~ are berel;>y acbo.!'}~gc~ the 
paqies he"retQ «P.~ ~ "foJi()ws: 
fl.. Mar~~~_g.Pro~: OOF and P.SM: ~if~:t9 irppJ~ent:~ of the-elements Qf the Mar~eting l'fogi:am ~ 
d~-~~ i;n Jgliibii:Aa~\.l~d ¥.~to,and.made~part:of-dll$ Agteetneµt.. ·p.at,t1es w.iU ~t~lya~ on 
~ SUQ$erlpti~# 0.f!~ wiU be··ptbn\o~ and the pdte -~f wm· ~ -C?~C9 to.· Ow end -~JI. -suoh. 
agree~~n~ once. htade in writing, wili ~c;--v-tilld ·w.til ~e pq who~s-offering {-s being W-QtIXQt~4 g{v~a. 
notice to the promoting: patty of. tbcir ·dcs,ir~'to ~9·longer •rf thirt oft'~g or- ptice. U_P:on =receipt of 
such notice, tbe Ptom.QP:J.li-Jll\to/ wiij.!iav.e:S0·day;s to. stop.promodnJ that off.er; · 
!2. Good and Worfonanfike Manner~ Q.OP. m):4. P&lVJ. wjQ. QSe . best· effot:tS In· the- performaJipe of this 
A:gteement, 1ind 1».th ~II .. be .r~~bn¢l?le fQr ~o:viding .setVices b).' ~e4 p~_e;>mtel" in a~rdance 
wlth the. specltications ~d r._equ.iremen.ts· of eacli Patty. on a tituely basis ·it:1 a: ptqf~ssio~al, good and 
wor~an6k;e manner,. and wilf .oonfonn. t6 the stan~ru;d$ ~f,~e, s1dll, dilige~ce •. performance· and. safety. 
.customarily ex<.1rcised ox·.oom~teQ.t prof~si~l}als p~tf'orm~g services siinilarto thos~ CQii~il)p,}aie-4 by 
this·Agteem~nJ. · · 
3. lndemnffication! Each Partjt-· (the "'lnd~illllify.i:ng· Party'') a'grecs to "indemnify and hofd ha1ml~· th~ 
other Party~ :its e.f.tfoefs, ·d1rce.tors, share.bold~~t eiJ]ployees. or a~enls: (the. '~Indemnified Par.lid') fro~ 
any and 'air Hjmilitles,. lo.ss~, daroa_ge~, .clai~~ suits~. jud~~n.ts-, c-osts- $.nd expense~ (lpcluding 
T~:;isonabl~ au9m~yf .f~ .and costs··ot' arty inve.stigatien or~on ·relat~- ~~re.to.) suffered ~r incurred 
by the; lnpemnified Parties ~dmifg from.. a. third PMtY- claim {i) as a- result of ·the Indemnifying PJlify~s 
_perfmlnance under· or. breaqh of· this :Agree~el,\~ or {ii) fr.om the ·breach or meotteetness of any. 
representation _or ~cy- mad~~ h~r.ein- bt the IIi~e~cy.itig Pmty.:- Tue jnd_~zwrl~ed f~y -shall_ ~ve. 
notice to t.h~· :I~4.~mnifying ~Y promptly al.wt. th~ -~~~fi~. :puny ha, actual knowle.d'ge of {itly 
claim as ta ,vbich ·Indemnity mliY. b¢ ~p~ght,. 1nd :.s~l permit the .Indemnifyi~_g- P~y Co. assume· uie. 
-~ef~nse: .of 1$y $\\Ch clahn. ~i.- AAY.. litlg~ti~p. -resultin~:there.ftoin• T.l:re fu,deirinjfyµ}g:P~ s~r .µ~t 'have 
the dght .tQ· ·_$e:gle- ct:?.~PrQ~~ or··otherwisc ·enter mtQ. any :agreen1e,1t :r;e~~: the disposition of any 
cl~ against the Indemnified P~y with91J:~ pri~l; ~~!?- co~s~nt and appio:Ytil. oftbe .. thde,;nrti:fi~ party, 
which sbaU not be·urtr~on~bly .withhel.d,. 
000175 
4. Limitat1on ot LiabHify:. In. po event will a iurty· b.e: iiabfo to ·the Q(her (or. inqirecf, 1-Qyidenia~ 
t:onseq~entiaI, p~mitive;_ sj:,ecfal ·ot exemplP:ty ~.nma2~s ( e:ven· ·if that ~arty has been advised of the 
possibility o( such drune;ge·s)~:·fil1Sing from perfqnn~ce lµ,1der. or firilurc of' perfonnance of.any provision 
of this Agt,eem~~t-:(u.it::lqdi.ng_:sl}ch :~~~ inct!fr~· 1>y tnird parties)~ such as~ .but nqt li.n1it¢.d to, loss .of 
rev~h\le or anticipatqi:\ prQ_fit~ or lost biisirtess, wiles-$ such bre~ch iS'--as a re;sult. of·gi:os~ ;neglig~nc;o or 
willful ~ise<;>µduct. · 
5. -.Confidentiality! From U111e tp. time a :Parfy: wi)l di:sclose· (the "f?iscloser~1) 00.nfide.ntial and ·proprietary. 
infomwtioti :tllat is lIUlik~~ ~ ~onfidential .or propdetar.t .or·.by the n~tute: Qf Jil~ 1;ir~u.msta,it~-of·tp~ 
disclosµre Qt conte.i:it- q( the ·infoi111atl611 should ~l1S6i1ably be: k.nOWll to :b~ c.qnfiden!i~l ("Confidential 
lnfonnati~n'~) to th! .other=.Party· :(the ·4Recipient''): :in ea~~- su~\\ case, -~e Recipient sluill hold. such 
Confidential Infonn·auon in ·strictest •contid.erice WJ~ shall protect.:Such 1nformation .by-all reasr.mabie. and 
hec~s.saty· s~tµriiy. m~ur~~.,. 'JAe· Confioential Inforimition shall .not .be. disclos·ed except t() .a Party~·$ 
empl9yee~. who ~~ subject .to siinilat ~onfide.nti-pl 6bligatipns ~ whp· h.aye a :n~- to know· -suefi 
Confidential •Jnfbtmatlotf · 1n otder· to ~rfoqn su.ch: P~rrty'=s obi{ gatj'ons .under tliis: Agreement.. Neither 
Party·siuul have a.ny n,ghtsi in t'1~ .01:he~ P.a.rtY's C~nfidefitial lnfor-mation.:antl· shaii te.tUm ~r ~~~Y all 
such C.Onfi&~tial Jt,formatj.@ .qpon :ffie. termination of this, Agreement or: request of th.e. Di~lf;>s~g 
f ar:tY~ Cfeon.fldeniiaL Infotmation~t $h.a1l' not ino!pd¢ iruotm~t!Pn that~ (~) !'/RS: ,~ready in the lawf Lil 
possesslon. of 'the Re~!~i~nt ptic>..t JP: .~ipt ther~Qf,- ~~lf" or i~directly, from 1he Disclose.r, (~1 
!awfully. become$ ay-aila'bl~·tc:, ·R-ecipieQtoo a- nqn~confidetitial basis from t sour¢e; 9thet ~31' Qf$.1~.~er 
that is ·l)oi tU1der an oblig~jfou tq keep: such ·irifonnation-confide.nnal; (c) i's.- ge\l..~ly av¢.l~ble to the 
pµblre Qther·tban.~ a=r~lf of.a·bteach. ofithis,.Agreer.nent.by.lte~lpient or i~ r~prese~tativ°'~):=or:(d) is 
-subsequent1y·m ino~den:tly d~v~{oJ?~.P).''.employ~es.t. co~~~ts-~r agents ofthe .Recipient ~thou"t 
r.eferenee·to·the C~nnd~tial bjfonru~iAA 4lsp1ose4 mider this ~eeoient .. t.:7otwf-thst~ru.Un~.anytliln~ to 
the .contrary in this ~gr~ent,_ notlihlg sh~I :prevent ·or prohibit ):t~lpient- ft9Il\ p{(?1li4~ ap~ss t~ 
C~1dide~t=iiµ 'Infbrmal'io!-l as--~j be -~uired. oy· l~w- pmvid~ th.at Re~ipi~n( ~~ as·mtio1i notice: as':is. 
reasonably. practical 11nd pmvide.s r~onlible ass~e to the Discloser in. cltailenging ~r maclify.iag th~ .. 
djsofo~t.iie so. r~tdred PY f~w. "ijle f.a,tties acknowledge that. Confidential loform~flon ts uniqu~ and 
~uapl~.J a.nd ~tdisc;io.simrin breach·.of tiifr~gr¢(ment will tesl\lt in irr;ep~able ·i~j-gry to I)iJcfo.s~ fat 
whie.h-mon~~ ~ges ~one-wcMa nQt: ~ ~ ~equate r,:q1e(ly.. Therefore\ the Parties agr~ tfiat in · 
the e-veilt of «: breach. or ~ijmaj- J;>~h ~l n1:1nfid~ntiality~ the Diiolosor_ :shall be;: entitle4 t~ se-e~ 
injunctive or: other ~ui~ble re.I(~f ~s 8: remedy far any such. breach o:r a:ntitipat~d breach without ,the. 
n~ces~ity of p~sti.ng a 1;,ond · 
:6. Au~it. Rights: D\\d~~ the. P:,;og{-'nt Tenn~ upol)· ;Went_y (10). .b_uslness days; ~prlo.r: ·writteJi. notice, rS.M. 
shall- hav~ the; rigl.u· to=send an:eniployee .or ot11er patty, :to OGF"s offices .tp•inspeet. OG'F1s t~ro.i:ds lo the 
ext~~t ~~onably-~~~satY arid IOL~Wfbr tlie· ~se of veflfyiiJg· b.OF'st@rils·.re~4ing customer sign~ 
upsj ~~latio~ and ·other infti"tn1aifon·mattrial to·tµe te~ ·of paym~nt under the .. Matketmg Pto~ 
Such inspection: ~1i .. not .Q~cur· r,tQX<:i ~ o.ij~~· pe.~ ~~eµ~ar ·)'eat durini ·the .Pr-ogram. T.eJD1. AU s~cilt 
J"OO$l'°ds shall b~ -~t~a.:~ Q9.iµide~~ ~omiaiion and sucli:-insp~~ti.ons shaU ~£conducted J,y :PS~ .~m.g 
OGF'n1Qm1a:I. -busin~,s hotl.ffl antl,in-a:reasonabl~ mann~ witmiµt tmdue bvrden: on the c0nduct of OOF•s 
business. ·such audit wili be at ~e'.~~~e ·p.f P.S.M,. ~~~:any audit.-siiows .-an uilderpayin'etiUo P$M · 
fot"the.atidit penoo of.fiv.~ per~nt {5%) ont\Ore-,.~in which .case-<5GF sluill.~Y the: reASQnable exp.~nses 
Ci( suc}J ·amJit.: Likewis.:~ _g~ the PiQ_gr,am·"T.~nn,. upqn t,~enty ~Q) h~4~~s. d~ys~ -p~·ior written: notice~ 
'OQI: s)lall hav.e the .. tfght t6·se11d ari.employee;:01 other party" to PSM~s·o.ffi~es,to inspoot"PSM't:tecords:to 
·the extent reasonably nfJe¢..~ty ·and ;$blelf for the purpQse o.f verifying PSM's _recoras··reg~ng Cl]Sq:)tner 
$lgn•ups, ~Jtcel~~tia:os, and atber µifonnation mater-ial" to the. terms af pa.YJ.llent und~= tne· Marke~ng 
P:ro~ Such ;inspection shall not occur ttior~ than-on¢e p~r calei:idar year· dµrin_g the ·Program :f eim. 
All. sueh. recortls sbalf be ·tteatecf ns,.Q;~d~al' ~~c;mnJ1f.ipn ~q .such -inspediom ·sfodJ b.e co11.tlq~t'ciJ by 
OGF; during P.$1r.s normal busines~ ·ho.~ . ~d· lh a re~ona'hie ~a:iihet• without. undue bwd~n .Qn ~e. 










underpayment to QGF for tl)e. ~ucµ\ _period-qf fiye p~,cent (5%) or. more~ in which. case PSM ·shall. ~ay-
the teaso_na,ble ~:xpenses. of suc];l. audit. 
Notices: Notices ·provided fot- in this Agre~ment will .be in ·writing ·an4 will be ,delivered by· hand, 
facsim.ile,:OVeynlght"m:ajl or ~tUfi¢d·mailr e~~n~ or r~gnizeq.-ovemight delivery s¢rv1ce-to the Parti~ 
at the·acl4resse_s_mentfoned -~~ov~_.or su~h-9ther-addresses either PartY may p.rovide. .to."the other faey·in 
wri~g~ 
Relationship;·_ Neither this. Agr.etm;l~t, nQr ~itQer .. Pai:ty's particlpadon iri the ~ubjcct matter- of· the 
A~me1_1t:i~ :intei:ide4 to" c~~~-w;ty :ag~~Y, .franc~se,'.~mles repres~ntative, joint ventu,t~, ·p&t.nershl._p~ or 
:enJplQ.Ym-ent rel~ti"t;>nship .between. the· Parties -ana ·neithe.r. .Party has any lµ.ltl;t.¢tity t9 bi~d 1he other 
without.prit>r \vritte.n cansent 
9. ienn; This Agre~t '?(>mm~.nees on ·fhe :Effeetive Date and .shail :eQntinn:e. in -~ect fur 011e y~ 
"Initial Te~" anq .shall autoiilati.cally. ·renew ther~after . .for" addi_tiou.31 .on~ -ye~ tenns any -of which 
.constitutes-a "Term" unl~ss-eithet pa(tY: ·pr.ovides· th~·Q.tner party with wri~ri.-notice: of non~renewal at 
]east (60) <layi prior ta ·the en4 qf a Tetm~ .Jf -~iU!~r. party shQuld beJn·mater.ial. breach of this. /1,greein_ept, 
and such breavlt· i~ nGt"recµfi~d, witb.jn :I d~y.s of noufi<:atioti By the Jj•n-breaching pan..y. then the non~ 
brea~g_pa~y .shal:1 have the,right-to terminate this J\:gteemeti.t dil 6-0 days no-ticete the.party in b~ach. 
To-the fullest exfent.ap_plicablet Sec.tfons·t, 3, 4~.S, 6, .~and.~ll J."CV.enue=s~~-i eon:upissi9n. and billing 
&. in.voice ob~galions of any ~oil at.4lohep. li~reto· ~n ¢.eir entirety .shall sumv.e termiiiatioti of this 
.A~ment= · 
it O.SeverabilitI: tf :atlY .pto:vision. of ibis Agr~ment. ~ invalia ·er uo.¢0l'Ce~bl~t. the Agre~illent will b~ 
; construed'. as if su~h. il).Valid ()l' ,m~furceable provision was not included. and the- i'e,namder of the• 
Agreemem. shall be en(o.reed.~ wri.tte.n.· · 
; 11. W ~iver: A Party's. f'ailwe tQ .en.f~ aqy .pto¥i~on "Of th~ /.l~~en;t wUi not. be. a waiver of its tiglit to 
l subsequmt.enf~~~tnt qf-the _ proviJion. or any o~er-provision,ofth~ Agre~men(. · 
i 12 .. Assigllft!ent; :N~ftltet· PaJ1Y :atay assign thjs Ag_~ment ~~out: the Qther J!arty 's prio1: written consent, 
except .as follo\\.'S: "© to an .~ffilia~~ provid¢-· tl;le assigning Party remains responsible -tbr all of its 
obligations. uoa~ t:W~- ~grccm~; and (ii) to an;a~q1urer of a11· or ~u"bstanti~y all o! .tli¢ :~ets., or :e¢.ty 
of th~ ~arty,_ proYided .the 1iCQUinniri>any ~sum.es =:t~P.Q.nSibiltty f.o.r ~fl -of' ~e- ~b!igati9~ of tluif Party-
uniierlbis A.gte~ent. · · · · . 
:IN WITNESS w:n;E~OF, lJre. parti~s- .fiereto havij caused tnis- Agreen1e1:1t to be effec;tiv.~ upon the 
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l : Marketing Each party shal1 perfo~in the folfowing activities :as the ''Maiketing.Partner1' at tl.i~ir 




· ! Te.nnjn~lion 
can only market:the·.otlfer" cbfilpany'~ Compl~entacy Products within flie .paid afoa of 
·thelvtatketilig P~~t's -v.:r~b.sJt~ pr·via ~ to previous.p(iymg customers. Offermg 
bundles th:at i.MlU_d~ :M?rketing: Partner1s and Complementary=.Pto.ducts to non-
custoµie~ is· ~hictly pr~fiibited. unie.ss::appm.v~ of:in writing by~ ltec~iying f Pl'O;l'.er. 
Promr>te the. other oompants CoI11plemen.~ Pro4uets :as ¢cµned in :Exhioit i,B:;,. 
thfoµgh ·the; web ~ijes. it.~"!05-~4 ·other applications. 
• C~1)tur~ ~µ-~ourer ·co~t~~fJ: eiµ.:<>_Um~t an~ payment infonrtatit>n for custQJilers-who 
~sh to: p~~e the Complementary Pr<1ducts,. and "ttansf~t.suiiici~nt .. lt:tfo,tnWQon 
lb create~an·,aceount.(Minnnwn.r.equir.ein.etlts! ~it:w.Last ijame-~~ ;email cW~re~s:; 
pto;V;iding. P.ost$i ·C,p@and-11: (laythne:pno~~ numb~r :will be tested for retetitfon 
pu.rposes).-fu. a:~ec~e pi~n~ 19 ~he .other .company Via a mutually. agreed upon 
in~rf~~-no later than 24 hours after a dustomei' places th~:Qrder .. 
·• Bilhhe. ~sto~er qpo~- p~h~e. 'f:hi$ will happen iromedi~if ~pqn-:an upfrQnt 
sale or .aftet th~ apPra_p.rla~ elapsed petioQ. JfscHd on a free .. trlaJ· bas.is. 
• -Prpv.i~ ot11er cohiP.«OY with an on.line m~thod .for thefr ~~prt teprcaen~~v.~s:-te-
cance1 fu.tn.re billin&$,·~~11<1.~ futnre billing·date> ot re!Q~a a past hilling. 
o lnforin oth~r comp~y if 1he ousit)met ~-aocaunt ~~-cJe39tfy~ for--any reason-other 
:than the acc~unt b$l ~e'U~d b "-.su .. ot.t r .resentathie..9f.tli~:0t~t t~nt . rui .. 
:each·party ~ce{ring QU_.o~ c,r.for·-a1'2Qmplmn.eritaty. rodliet '~Rtc:eivfrig P.atttner ·trom 
the otb~r c9qiga,ny :''M~keting•Partnef' slmll-perf~nn the following aqfivit.ies i\~-~ 
·Receivin$ P4i1ner'-s, ~olei cost,ancl ~~pell$¢, ~d =~der th:~ llee.eiyipg f~~er,s exclusive 
. co.nfiol:. 
-.. Fulfill orders· f<>r custom~ passe4-ta Re.~i~~ng-Pa$~-by Marketlng.P:artner at 
ser.v.iee.1¢ycls C!.onsi$te~t- with.tho$e pro'\ride.d by Receiving Parmer generally. 
• Provid~·timely e~Q~er supw.rt ~ervice whose represtn.tatives ·acth-ely eance.l 
-~ billi1;1gs, ~~tend-a future billing date, 9r·r.e.fuiia' p~ mlllngs. ~ncq¢."e4 it? . 
~tisfy-custamers·-U.siriB tae'intei.faoe provided by Mattreiing Partner for ,ueh 
purposes.. incoming ~alls-'will be pick~d l!JJ. ,t Ie~st 70% of th~ time. clurins 
bilSmess. he.urs ~-all __ phon~ ~ls-mid emails will- be personally r.esponded.lo 
wi.~-48 lJ.p;urs w.ith.!.tlie aV: e monthl · r.e.s · on$e tbne.bei · · l~s flum. 24 hours. 
• ln:.additi~ t9 :the ~~ntli~~n:r(gl}.ts cove.r.ed fu: Secuon .9 Dtthi~ z,grte,n):lllt, ·any· 
time prior. fG 9.0 days.:after·the first -~fer of ~rollmel)t anq ·p;iyroent infonnatio~ 
nescribed in Exhibit "A'\ se~iion 1, either·pa:rty (?an_proyide-~tten notia.e to the-
other:of their. 4'e:;ire tQ ~inafu th~.:program. · If sticli: ·even~t·tlie.PrQgian;i will 
te-m~_inate 60 ~~$ after receiptofsai:cf wrltte11:-notl~e .. 
.2li· Product . • _The·pr~uct;C.Qnfigiiratjbr,1 ~Q.d,priciqg w:ill be detennirtoo:ml)tually ml~ :may: QnlY." 













• ~h-~9.mpany .shali own ai\Y data that if coilecf$ .with r~gar~ktQ customers a$ Well 
as :an:r, data "that [s:•:seht to jt °t:>y the c:5ther:cQ.t;rtp_any ~·:a p~ ofthi~-Marketing 
Pro·· . 
G Revenue-share and commission$ $ball be as-defined in "Exhil1i(J3..and~can Ot¥Y:be 
changed tbr,Qugh muhJal a~e~~ent of-bo(~· parties,, and niust-be do:~to.iiertted with 
an aodep-<\:u.ni to 'thiir~eciment. ~everitie share payments:shail apply only to 
billings-f~rmembetshij,-s-sold via the· Marketi_ng .PaM~r a,nd not f oi;: any future· 
.. mduots:·or. sen1foe.s .that.miJ: . be. pffered 10· the Customer li . th~_R-eeeivin . Partner~ 
. . . . .. . . . . . . 
'- In the event.oftertnlnatio~ of tlfe Markefi:ng.P.rQ~ by either patty, Marketing· 
P~net sh.ajl pay Re~iving Partner for all commissions eiuued ft.om tlie progi'atJl: 
priqr to the Temrlimtfon dllle, and. will also ·pay .I{eoei~g ·P~~J;:fQr alt· · 
.~o~ssioris on.sales .dile,to refetra~ w.1ii~h oc~~ prior to T¢11ll-in~1ion l?ut !Qr-




Commission_·Perc~~g~: PSM wilt pay OGF a Revenue: Share popsi:stjn~ qf.40%0.ft~e Qrqss R~t(enues (it~t -c;,f 
rctubts and chargobacks) ·collected fro.m any-cust0.m:ct who is· r.oferreiHQ O'.GF :fro~ PSM and is subsequently· . 
bitled by ·PsM. Thi$ Rev~1'µe. Share· will apply to ·a11:payrnents·made: by such.-eustom.ers::fofcurr:ertt 1nembers'hip 
~ubscriptiol)S:nat for ~ny fuh:tre n~.product-offenilg or services. 
Payinent Terms·: By the 5th of each month,. PSM·wm pr4Y.ide OGF \\?th ~.list of.al1.PSM·referred c'ustotners 
whd- were su~ssfuily- biUecJ cl~g the P~9f moµt).'l as: w~Jl as any refunds= or- cfiarg~backs associa.te.d. with.any 
P.SM custo~s dtµfag th~ san:ie -\Aon;th,. along with the Gross Revenue associ$te-d' "\iith eiiPb trans~e.tiun. l3y the 
30th ·of'eaeh mon~. ~SM will provide OGF payment via .cfii'ect batik depbsit o.f the Revenue-Shar.ei 
te.tininatlon:· In the event tbat.this.-ccm~act is tenrililf)ted; :PSM will-continue to pay theappro,priate-ReY.encte 
Slfdt'-e· to OOF fot C~lOll'ler.s. r~~~g~~ t(_) OQF ·duriD:g :the tinle. period'. ili.~t the contr-ac.t was in force. Hnwever,. 
follpwing .12.months:after:tennin:rtion-.of'tllis agreefuen.t, if for any 3 mor,.th perio4. :th~_~y~,:ag~. tQ~ Reve~ue 
S~.owed ·to OOF per month..is less than:·$·250, ·the.l\ foUo-w.ing the-en~ of that 3 month period.P-SM may-cease. 
anyl future Rtvl:nue·share paymeµts to Owf\ 
t . 
Commission Percentage: OGF will'pay- PSM al~.eyenue,Sh~~ consisting.of 40% of the Gross R~v~n,u~ (~et of 
returns an:d char.gebaeks)' Qollected-t.rom aqy customer .who is referred.to· i>sM front ()GF and js ~ub~~qu~tly 
bill~ by OGF.. 11$. R~v~nue Sbare will apply:to. ail payments m~de by sueh oustmn~ for·~~t:me~b.ermip 
sub~criptions nof for :any .future.new pr.od\tct off'eriQi Qt ~ervic~s · 
P~ntent Ter.ms: :By~-S~ of~ mpnlh, QGF :wiil provid.e P.-SM·with ~ Hst of all bOF ~r~-custp~e.~s· 
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Robert L. Jeffs, #4349 
Randall L. Jeffs, #12129 
JEFFS & JEFFS, P.C. 
90 North 100 East 
P.O. Box 888 
Provo, UT, 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-8848 
Email: rljeffs@jeffslawoffice.com 
rzjeffs@jeffslawoffice.com 
Attorneys for P laintif.fs 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
Z-CORP, dba OneGreatFamily.com, a Utah 
Corporation; and ONEGREATFAMILY, 
LLC, a Utah limited liability company, 
Plaintiffs, 
~ v. 
ANCESTRY.COM, INC., a Utah 
Corporation; and ANCESTRY.COM 
OPERATIONS, INC., a Utah Corporation, 
Defendants. 
COMPLAINT 
Civil No.: ___ _ 
Judge_:----
COME NOW Plaintiffs Z-Corp and OneGreatFamily, LLC _by and through their counsel, 
vi) Robert L. Jeffs and Randall L. Jeffs of the law firm Jeffs & Jeffs, P .C., and for cause of action 
against Defendants allege and aver as follows: 
PARTIES 
1. Plaintiff Z-Corp is a Utah corporation located in Utah County, State of Utah doing 
business as OneGreatFamily.com. 
2. Plaintiff OneGreatFamily, LLC is a Utah limited liability company located in Utah 
County, State of Utah. 
3. Defendant Ancestry.com, Inc. is a Utah corporation located in Utah County, State of 
Utah. 
4. Defendant Ancestry.com Operations, Inc. is a Utah corporation located in Utah County, 
State of Utah. 
JURISDICTION 
5. The facts and circumstances of this Complaint involve a Marketing Agreement and 
subsequent Consent to Assignment, which was created in Utah County, State_ofUtah. 
6. The principle place of business for Z-Corp and OneGreatFamily, LLC is 1371 West_ 1250 
South, Orem, Utah 84058. The principle place of business for Ancestry.com, Inc. and 
Ancestry.com Operations Inc. is 360 West 5800 North, Provo, Utah 84604. 
7. This Court properly maintains jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. 
§78A-5-102. 
8. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3•304. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
9. Z-Corp, its dba OneGreatFamily.com and subsidiary OneGreatFamily, LLC (hereinafter 
"OGF") have an ongoing contractual relationship with Ancestry.com, Inc. and Ancestry.com 
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Operations, Inc. (hereinafter "Ancestry") through a Marketing Agreement and subsequent 
Consent to Assignment with Ancestry. A copy of the Marketing Agreement is attached 
herewith as Exhibit A. A copy of the Consent to Assignment is attached herewith as Exhibit B. 
10. Initially, OGF entered into the Marketing Agreement with People Search Media, LLC 
(who operated Archives.com) on April 20, 2009. 
11. Later, in August 2012 Ancestry was in the process of acquiring Archives.com and during 
this process, OGF and Ancestry agreed to the assignment of the Marketing Agreement to 
Ancestry.' This agreement is reflected in the Consent to Assignment, Ex. B. 
12. Ancestry continues to operate Archives.com. 
13. The Marketing Agreement provided that there would be a cooperation of marketing 
between OGF and Archives.com. 
14. Specifically, the Marketing Agreement provides that, "OGF and [Ancestry] will use best 
efforts in the performance of this Agreement." Ex. A. 
15. The Marketing Agreement contemplates that once a customer has subscribed to 
Archives.com, they will be presented immediately with an offer for a subscription to 
OneGreatFamily.com. 
16. this presentation requirement is to be made in the "paid area" following the signup for an 
Archives.com subscription. 
17. Throughout the several year history of the Marketing Agreement the "paid area" has been 
mutually understood and treated by the parties as the area that immediately follows the entering 
of a customer's financial information. 
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18. Additionally, Archives.com presented and marketed OneGreatFamily.com subscriptions 
on its Products Page. 
19. The Marketing Agreement also provided for revenue sharing between OGF and 
Archives.com; specifically for every OneGreatFamily.com subscription Archives.com would 
receive 60% of the revenue and OneGreatFamily.com would receive 40% of the revenue. 
20. After the August 2012 acquisition of Archives.com by Ancestry, there was a gradual but 
significant reduction in the number of subscriptions to OneGreatFamily.com through 
Archives.com. 
21. Subscriptions to OneGreatFamily .com continued to lower until they reached a level that 
was approximately half of the historical · subscription levels, despite the fact that Archives.com 
subscriptions were increasing. 
22. After researching and investigating the matter, OGF discovered that subscription offers to 
OneGreatFamily.com were frequently not being presented in the "paid area" of Archives.com. 
23. Upon information and belief, Ancestry had gradually begun substituting advertiseme~ts 
for their wholly owned subsidiary companies within the "paid area" rather than presenting a 
subscription offer for OneGreatFamily.com. 
24. In January 2014, OGF discovered that the subscription offer of OneGreatFamily.com on 
the Archives.com Product Page had been entirely removed. 
25. On April 27, 2014, OneGreatFamily.com subscriptions were suddenly additionally 
reduced and OGF noticed that all offers for OneGreatFa~ily.com had been removed from the 
"paid area" of Archives.com. 
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26. Ancestry then began only offering subscription offers for their wholly owned subsidiaries 
and associated entities in the "paid area." 
27. The subscription offer for OneGreatFamily.com was restored to the "paid area" on April 
29, 2014. 
28. In subsequent discussions between the Parties, Ancestry informed the Plaintiff that 
Ancestry .com had "reinterpreted" the Marketing Agreement and that they no longer were 
-required to offer OneGreatFamily.com subscriptions in the "paid area," contrary to the Parties 
historical practices and course of dealing. 
29. On May 10, 2014 the OneGreatFamily.com subscription offer was again removed from 
the "paid area" of Archives.com. 
30. Once ·again, Ancestry then began only offering subscription offers for their wholly owned 
subsidiaries and associated entities in the "paid area." 
31. The termination of the OneGreatFamily.com subscription offer from the Archives.com 
"paid area" resulted in a very substantial reduction in OneGreatFamily.com su~scriptions derived 
from Archives.com. 
32. To date there appears to be no marketing of OneGreatFamily.com anywhere in the 
Archives.com "paid area." 
33. During the same time, in May, 2014, Archives.com restored the OneGreatFamily.com 
link to its Products Page, however it is only viewable after one logs into Archives.com under a 
current Archives.com subscription. 
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34. As the Parties have exchanged subscription and payment information for thousands of 
customers, OGF has uncovered information that between 20,000 and 70,000 payments from 
OneGreatFamily.com customer subscriptions are missing that are due from Ancestry. 
35. The Marketing Agreement contains within it an Audit Rights provision that permits OGF 
to audit Ancestry's "records to the extent reasonably necessary and solely for the purpose of 
verifying [Ancestry's] records regarding customer sign-ups, cancellations, and other information 
material to the terms of payment under the Marketing Program." Ex. A. 
36. On the basis of the Audit Rights provision, OGF demanded an audit of Ancestry's 
records regarding its Archives.com subscriptions, its OneGreatFamily.com subscription records, 
and its·terms of payment records, including the ability to validate "paid area" subscription offers. 
37. Ancestry refused. to honor OGF's request and instead offered only to allow OGF to 
inspect some limited financial records that would not have enabled OGF to conduct a meaningful 
and actual audit. 
FIRST CAUSE. OF ACTION 
(Breach of Contract) 
38. Plaintiffs incorporate and re-allege the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 
39. OGF and Ancestry entered into· a contract when they signed the Consent to Assignment 
and agreed to the terms of the Marketing Agreement to share marketing of their respective 
websites. 





41. Ancestry has breached its duties under the Marketing Agreement and Consent to 
Assignment in multiple ways. 
-42. Ancestry breached the "best efforts" provision of the Marketing Agreement when it 
departed from the historic practice and course of dealing between the Parties an~ failed to 
consistently offer OneGreatFamily .com subscriptions in the "paid area" after Ancestry first took 
over the Marketing Agreement through the Consent to Assignment. 
43. Ancestry breached the Marketing Agreement when, on May 10, 2014 and continuing 
through the filing of this Complaint, it completely removed OneGreatFamily.com offers from the 
· "paid area" of Archives.com. 
44. Ancestry breached the Marketing ~greement when it removed OneGreatFamily.com 
subscription offers from the Archives.com Products Page for approximately 5 months. 
45. Ancestry breached the Marketing Agreement because, upon information and belief: it has 
withheld payments for subscriptions that are due to OGF. 
46. Ancestry breached the Marketing Agreement when it refused to comply completely with 
the tenns of the Audit Rights provision of the Marketing Agreement and indicated its intention to 
only supply information to OGF in such a way that OGF would_ be prevented from conducting a 
meaningful and actual audit. 
47. As a result of Ancestry's multiple breaches, OGF has suffered damages in an amount to 
be detennined by the Court but believed to be in excess of $8,900,000. 
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SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing) 
48. Plaintiffs incorporate and re-allege the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 
49. Upon signing the Consent to Assignment of the Marketing Agreement, Ancestry 
inherently undertook the obligation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing to not 
intentionally harm OGF's rights under the contract. 
50. Notwithstanding this obligation, Ancestry intentionally sought to undermine and thwart 
the full performance of the contract and failed to use their "best efforts" to market 
OneGreatFamily.com. 
51. This breach of the covenant occurred in multiple ways, including· not consistently 
offering OneGreatFamily.com in the "paid area," and the eventual removal of 
OneGreatFamily.com subscription offers within the "paid area" of Archives.com, and by only 
making OneGreatFamily.com subscription offers viewable on the Archives.com Products Page 
after one signs in as a current account member of Archives.com. 
52. The int~ntional acts of limiting OneGreatFamily.com subscription. offers within 
Archives.com by Ancestry prevented OGF from being able to receive the fruits of the contract. 
53. This change of conduct by Ancestry towards OGF is inconsistent with the prior course of 
dealing between the parties because Ancestry has opportunistically sought to reinterpret the 
meaning of "paid area" for their own benefit and to the detriment of OGF. 
54. Additionally, due to the nature of the Marketing Agreement, Ancestry is under an 
obligation to promote and market OneGreatFamily.com, which purpose was undermined by 
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Ancestry's overt and intentional efforts to put OneGreatFamily.com out of business and take 
their market share by failing to market OneGreatFamily.com in the "paid area" and instead 
opting to promote Ancestry's own affiliates and subsidiaries. 
55. Ancestry's conduct of restricting OneGreatFamily.com advertising and subscription 
offers from Archives.com is a deliberate attempt to deprive market share from 
OneGreatFamily.com, and an attempt to hurt or potentially drive out of business 
OneGreatFamily.com in violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
56. Consequently as a result of these actions, Ancestry has breached the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing because they have not allowed OGF to receive their fruits from the 
contract, have varied from the understood meaning of the contract, departed from the previous 
course of · dealing that had been established by the parties, and by attempting to put 
OneGreatFamily.com out of business. 
57. OGF has suffered damages in an amount to be determined by the Court but believed to 
be in excess·of$8,900,000. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Conversion) 
58. Plaintiffs incorporate and re-alleg~ the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 
59. Ancestry exercised and continues to exercise dominion and control over subscription 
funds to which OGF is immediately entitled. 
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60. Ancestry's possession, use and conversion of these funds is inconsistent with OGF's 
present rights to receive the subscription funds for the missing 20,000 to 70,000 subscriptions of 
OneGreatFamily.com that are owed to OGF. 
61. Under the terms of the Marketing Agreement, OGF has an immediate right to receive 
payments from OneGreatFamily.com subscriptions and the refusal of Ancestry to make these 
payments has resulted in OGF being deprived of the use and possession of these payments. 
62. Ancestry's continued possession and use of the these funds is intentional, willful, and 
without legal justification. 
63. As a result of Ancestry's unlawful possession, control and conversion of these missing 
subscription ·payments, OGF has suffered damages in an amount to be determined by the Court 
but believed to ~e in excess of$3,000,000. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Relations) 
64. Plaintiffs incorporate and re-allege the preceding par:agraphs as if fully set forth herein. 
65. Ancestry has intentionally interfered with potential subscribers ofOneGreatFamily.com. 
66. Specifically, rather than marketing OneGreatFamily.com to potential subscribers within 
the "paid area". of the Archives.com website as required under the Marketing Agreement, 
Ancestry has marketed its own subsidiaries and related entities, from which it derived substantial 
subscriptions and corresponding profits. 
67. Therefore, Ancestry diverted prospective OneGreatFamily.com subscribers to its own 
web services instead. 
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68. This intentional interference with OGF's prospective economic relations was done for an 
improper purpose. Namely, Ancestry had a contractual obligation to market OGF products, and 
its failure and refusal to do so, together with its marketing of Ancestry products in the place of 
OGF products qualifies as an improper purpose. 
69. Moreover, upon information and belief, Ancestry undertook these actions with the 
express purpose of harming OGF's business, reducing OGF's market share, and potentially 
driving OGF out of business. Such intentions also qualify as an improper purpose. 
70. Upon information and belief, the failure of Ancestry to perform its duties under the 
Marketing Agreement constitute more than a feeling of ill-will towards OGF, rather the 
predominant · purpose behind the breach was to cause injury to OGF by stealing potential 
subscribers from OneGreatFamily.com and this purpose predominated over any other legitimate 
purpose for Ancestry's actions. 
71. Ancestry had an inherent duty in the Marketing Agreement to not interfere with potential 
su~scribers that OneGreatFamily.com would receive through Archives.com. Rather Ancestry 
had a duty to promote and market OneqreatFamily.com. 
72. These actions of intentionally interfering with potential OneGreatFamily.com subscribers 
have significantly reduced the revenues, total number of subscribers, and the value of OGF' s 
business. 
73. As a result of Ancestry's intentional interference, OGF has suffered damages in an 
amount to be determined by the Court but believed to be in excess of$21,000,000. 
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FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
{Punitive Damages) 
74. Plaintiffs incorporate and re-allege the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 
75. The combined actions of Ancestry to breach and thwart performance under the Marketing 
Agreement and prevent OGF from receiving the fruits of the contract constitute willful and 
malicious conduct because they intentionally breached the clear and understood language of the 
contract. 
76. Additionally, by refusing to comply completely with the terms of the Audit Provision of 
the Marketing Agreement Ancestry has not allowed OGF an opportunity to complete a 
meaningful audit. 
77. Such actions were taken intentionally, knowingly, and with conscious disregard for 
OGF's rights. 
78. As a result of this deliberate, willful, and malicious conduct, OGF is entitled to punitive 
damages, pursuant to UT AH CODE ANN. § 78B-8-20 I, in an amount to be determined by the 
Court. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE PLAINTIFF prays for relief as follows: 
1. For a determination by the Court that Ancestry breached the Marketing Agreement by; 
departing from the historic practice and course of dealing between the parties in not consistently 
offering OneGreatFamily.com subscriptions within the "paid area;" completely removing 
OneGreatFamily.com offers from the "paid area;" removing OneGreatFamily.com from the 
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Archives.com Products Page for approximately 5 months; withholding customer payments for 
OneGreatFamily .com subscriptions and; refusing to comply completely with the terms of the 
Audit Rights provision of the Marketing Agreement; and that such breaches caused damage to 
the Plaintiff in an amount of approximately $8,900,000. 
2. For a determination by the Court that Ancestry breached the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing through their deliberate attempt to reinterpret the meaning of "paid area," 
departing from the prior course of dealing, attempting to put OneGreatFamily .com out of 
business, and preventing OGF to receive the fruits of the contract; and that such violation caused 
damage to the Plaintiff in an amount of approximately $8,900,000. 
3. For· a determination by the Court that Ancestry has converted Plaintiff's property; and 
that such actions caused damage to the Plaintiff in an amount of approximately $3,000,000. 
4. For a determination by the Court that Ancestry has intentionally interfered with 
prospective economic relations of OGF; and that such actions have caused damage in an amount 
of approximately $21,000,000. 
5. For punitive damages, pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-8-201, in an amounfto be 
determined by the Court. 
6. For costs and attorney's fees. 




DATED and SIGNED this 10th day of October, 2014. 
JEFFS & JEFFS, P .C. 
/s/ Robert L. Jeffs 
Attorney for the Plaintiffs 
@ 
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Addendum D 
FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
1 /• / lS Ml' .... Deputy i , 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Z-CORP., dba OneGreatFamily.com, a Utah 
Corporation, and ONEGREATFAMILY, 
LLC, a Utah limited liability company, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ANCESTRY.COM INC., a Utah 
Corporation; and ANCESTRY.COM 
OPERATIONS INC., a Utah Corporation, 
Defendants. 
PEFtlJPANTS1 
RULING RE: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
TO DISMISS 
Case No. 140401466 
Judge Fred D. Howard 
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants' November 13, 2014 Motion to 
Dismiss the Complaint with accompanying memorandum. On December 24, 2014, Plaintiffs. 
filed their Memorandum in Opposition of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Complaint. 
Defendants then filed their Reply and Request to Submit for Hearing and Decision on January 
12, 2015. The Court heard oral argument on March 9, 2015. Having heard oral argument and 
having reviewed the parties' motion and memoranda, the Court now makes the following Ruling. 
RULING 
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs motions to dismiss for failure 
viJ to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. When considering a Rule l 2{b )( 6) motion to 
dismiss, the Court views the facts in the complaint as true, and determines "the plaintifrs right to 
relief based on those facts." 1 In addition, under a Rule l 2(b )( 6) motion this Court is not deciding 
the merits of the case. 2 As a result, this Court is "concerned solely with the sufficiency of the 
pleadings, and not the underlying merits of the case."3 Further, this Court recognizes that "[a] 
dismissal is a severe measure and should be granted ... only if it is clear that a party is not 
entitled to relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of its claim .. "4 
On April 20, 2009, Plaintiffs and People Search Media, LLC, both of which operate 
online family research websites, entered into a marketing agreement. Subsequently, in August 
2012, Defendants, who also operate online family research resources, acquired People Search 
Media, LLC, and consented to the assignment of the Marketing Agreement. Plaintiffs allege that 
since Defendants took over People Search Media that Defendants have changed how they 
perform under the Marketing Agreement. Specifically, Plaintiffs claim that Defendants have 
breached their marketing obligations under the Marketing Agreement by failing to market 
Plaintiffs at all. Plaintiffs argue that the obligatory language of the Marketing Agreement "shall 
perform" obligates Defendants to market Plaintiff in a specific way. Defendants argue that the 
Marketing Agreemen~ at issue here does not require Defendants to perform any specific 
promotion, and that therefore Defendants are not in breach of the contract. 
This case comes down to interpretation of the language of the contract. To withstand a 
motion to dismiss on a contract claim,- a plaintiff must allege "( 1) a contract, (2) performance by 
the party seeking recovery, (3) breach of the contract by the other party, and (4) damages."5 
Plaintiffs hav~ appropriately alleged the existence of a contract, performance, and damages. 
1 State v. Apotex Corp., 2012 UT 36, ,I 42 { citing Oakwood Viii. LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, 1 8). 
2 Williams v. Bench, 2008 UT App 306, 1 20. 
3 Apotex, 2012 UT 36, ,r 42 (citing Oakwood Viii. LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, ,I 8). 
4 Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622,624 (Utah 1990). 




What remains is for this Court to determine whether Plaintiffs have appropriately alleged, or can 
appropriately allege, a breach under the asserted facts. 
When interpreting a contract, "the intention of the contracting parties is controlling." 6 
Further, when a contract's language "is unambiguous, the intention of the parties may be 
det~rmined as a matter oflaw based on the language of the agreement."7 A contract's language is 
only ambi~ous where "it is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation because of 
uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms or other facial deficiencies. "8 The Court may only 
"consider extrinsic evidence of the parties' intentions, "9 when a contract is ambiguous. 
Here, the Court finds the contract to be unambiguous, and so extrinsic evidence is 
unnecessary. The phrase in the Marketing Agreement at issue here states: 
Each party shall perform the following activities as the "Marketing Partner" at 
their sole cost and expense, and under their own exclusive control. 10 
This sentence consists of two clauses, an independent clause and a dependent clause. 
First, "[a] clause is a group of words that includes a subject and a predicate."11 An independent 
clause is different from a dependent clause in that "[a]n independent clause can stand alone as a 
sentence, while a dependent clause must be accompanied by an independent clause." 12 Further, a 
dependent clause can also be a restrictive modifying clause. A"[ a] restrictive modifying clause 
( or essential clause) ... is essential to the meaning of a sentence because it limits the thing it 
6 Peterson v. Sunrider Corp., 2002 UT 43, 1J 18, 48 P.3d 918. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. at~ 19. 
9 Id. at 4jJ 18. 
to Marketing Agreement, at Exhibit "A", CJ 1. 
11 University of Illinois, Grammar Handbook: Independent and Dependent Clauses, 




refers to. The meaning of the sentence would change if the clause were deleted." 13 
In this instance, the clause "Each party shall perform the following activities as the 
'Marketing Partner,"' forms the independent clause. This is the clause that Plaintiff argues 
includes obligatory language. Generally, "shall perform" is indeed obligatory language that. 
imposes a duty upon a party, and would do so in this case were the sentence to end there. 
However, in this case, this sentence includes the dependent clause "at their sole cost and 
expense, and under their own exclusive control." This dependent clause is a restrictive modifying 
clause, changing the entire meaning of the independent clause. This clause turns all exercise of 
any activities referred to in the independent clause over to the "exclusive control" of the 
exercising party, essentially negating the phrase "shall perform." Because each party maintains 
exclusive control over any activities performed under the Marketing Agreement, each party 
retains the right to perform any amount of marketing that the party chooses, including no 
marketing· at all. Because Defendants have no affirmative duty to perform any marketing activity 
under the Marketing Agreement at all, they cannot be in breach of contract for performing no 
marketing activity. 
Because Plaintiffs' causes of action all rely on the contractual relationship between 
Plaintiffs and Defendants, Plaintiffs' causes of action are dismissed. The first cause of action, 
breach of contract, is dismissed because, as was just explained, Defendants did not breach the 
Marketing Agreement, and therefore Plaintiffs are not entitled to relief under these facts. 
The second cause of action, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 
13 University of Illinois, Grammar Handbook: Restrictive and Nonrestrictive Clauses, 
http://www.cws.illinois.edu/workshop/writers/restrictiveclauses/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2015). 
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likewise fails. Plaintiffs rely on the "best efforts" or "Good and Workmanlike Manner"14 clause 
to claim that because Defendants stopped marketing Plaintiffs' products, they failed to use their 
best efforts in performance of the agreement. Here again, because Defendants retain exclusive 
control over any marketing activity, Defendants had no obligation to do any marketing at all. 
ViJ Plaintiffs cannot invoke this covenant to "create obligati~ns 'inconsistent with express 
contractual terms. "'15 Even Defendants' previous course of dealings cannot invoke this covenant 
to create new obligations inconsistent with express contractual terms. 16 Though Defendants in 
the past may have marketed Plaintiffs in the way Plaintiffs_ pref er, that "does not itself establish a 
binding legal covenant to [continue to] do so."17 Thus, under the language of the contract, 
Defendants' best efforts at marketing could include no efforts. Therefore, Defendants are not in 
breach of contract under this clause either, and there has been no breach of this covenant. 
The third cause of action, conversion, fails as well. Defendants argue that the economic 
loss doctrine bars this claim. In Utah, "the economic loss doctrine bars all tort claims seeking 
recovery for economic losses when the claims are not based on a duty independent of the 
contractual obligations between the parties."18Plaintiffs argue that the tort of conversion is not 
vii precluded by the economic loss doctrine because their claim of conversion is not based on the 
Marketing Agreement. Plaintiffs argue that by failing to remit subscription funds to Plaintiffs, 
Defendants have "co-opted the Plaintiffs' website and have made it available to individuals for 
which Plaintiffs have not received subscription funds ... convert[ing] the Plaintiffs' website for 
14 Marketing Agreement, ,r 2. · 
15 Young Living Essential Oils, LC v. Marin, 2011 UT 64, f l 0, 266 P.3d 814 ( citation omitted). 
16 See Id at 1 15. 
17 Id at115. 




their own use and benefit."19 
This court finds that the economic loss doctrine precludes Plaintiffs' conversion claim. 
First, after reviewing the Complaint, the court cannot find where Plaintiffs allege that Defendants 
have co-opted Plaintiffs' website. The Complaint only outlines a claim that Defendants converted 
subscription funds to which Plaintiffs are allegedly entitled. These subscription funds flow 
directly from the Marketing Agreement and cannot be said to be extra-contractual in nature. This 
claim appears in actuality to be a claim for consequential damages. Consequential-datnages are 
part and parcel of a contract claim, and cannot be claimed in tort, clearly being barred by the 
economic loss ~octrine. Further, even if Defendants claim that Plaintiffs co-opted their website 
were in the Complaint, it would also fail as a matter of law. Plaintiffs provided Defendants 
access to their website pursuant to the Marketing Agreement. Having done so, Plaintiffs cannot 
now complain that Defendants have access to Plaintiffs' website. In any case, this claim also 
clearly flows from the Marketing Agreement, and is thus barred by the economic loss doctrine. 
Therefore, Plaintiffs are not entitled to relief under any state of facts which could be proved in 
support of their conversion claim. 
The fourth cause of action, intentional interference with prospective economic relations, 
was dismissed without prejudice per stipulation of the parties. 
The fifth cause of action, punitive damages, relies on the Marketing agreement which 
allows punitive damages for breach of contract that is "a result of gross negligence or willful 
misconduct. "20 Here again, because there has been no breach of contract, there is also no gross 
. negligence or willful misconduct. Therefore, Plaintiffs are not entitled to relief for this claim. 
19 Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 'the Complaint, at 14. 





Therefore, because Plaintiffs' claims fail as a matter of law, the Court grants Defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss, and the following causes of action are dismissed with prejudice: 
l. Breach of Contract 
2. Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
3. Conversion 
5. Punitive Damages 
Plaintiff's fourth cause of action, Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Relations, 
was dismissed without prejudice at oral argument on March 9, 2015. Counsel for Defendants is 
directed to prepare an order consistent with this Ruling. 
DATED this />~ day of April, 2015. 
BY THE COURT: 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
Z-CORP, dba OneGreatFamily.com, a Utah 
Corporation; and ONEGREATF AMIL Y, 
LLC, a Utah limited liability company, 
Plaintiffs, 
V. 
ANCESTRY.COM, INC., a Utah 
Corporation; and ANCESTRY.COM 
OPERATIONS, INC.,.a Utah Corporation, 
Defendants. 
OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS' 
PROPOSED ORDER GRANTING 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS 
AND DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S 
COMPLAINT 
Civil No.:140401466 
Judge: Fred D. Howard 
COME NOW Plaintiffs Z-Corp and OneGreatFamily, LLC by and through their counsel, 
Robert L. Jeffs and Randall L. Jeffs of the law firm Jeffs & Jeffs, P.C., and pursuant to Utah Rule 
of Civil Procedure 7, hereby submit the following Objection to the Defendants' Proposed Order 
Granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Dismissing Plaintiffs' Complaint (hereinafter 
'Proposed Order'). 
000231 
The Proposed Order omits a critical issue of importance that was before the Court and 
which deserves the Court's attention. Not only did Plaintiffs bring a cause of action for breach of 
contract on the theory that the Defendants had failed to appropriately market under the 
requirements of the Marketing Agreement, but Plaintiffs also alleged that Defendants had breached 
the contract by failing to render payment to Plaintiffs for funds already received by Defendants 
under the terms of the Marketing Agreement. 
This cause of action for breach of contract is specifically alleged in paragraphs 34 and 46 
of the Complaint. The Proposed Order also does not address Plaintiffs' claim for breach of contract 
on the theory that Defendants failed to allow Plaintiffs access to information in order to allow 
Plaintiffs to conduct a meaningful audit under the Marketing Agreement. This cause of action for 
breach of contract is specifically alleged in paragraphs 35, 36,' 37 and 46 of the Complaint. 
Moreover, both of these causes of action were also addressed in the Plaintiffs' Memorandum in 
Opposition to the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on pages 4, 8 and 9 of the memorandum, and 
were raised by Plaintiffs at oral arguments on the Motion to Dismiss. 
The Court's Ruling makes no findings as to why either of these causes of action should be 
dismissed and the Defendants' Proposed Order is likewise silent on these two causes of action. 
Nonetheless, both the Ruling and the Proposed Order. dismiss all the causes of action in the 
Complaint without specifically addressing these two causes of action. This is error, and therefore 
the Plaintiffs object to the Proposed Order for these reasons. 
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DATED and SIGNED this 21st day of April, 2015. 
JEFFS & JEFFS, P.C. 
Isl Randall L. Jeffs 
Attorney for the Plaintiffs 
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